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A Glass Half Empty: Drinking Water
in First Nations Communities
Sarah N. Morales1

Introduction
Water is an essential part of life, especially for First Nations citizens as it contributes not only to their physical survival but their cultural survival as well. Virtually
all rights of Aboriginal peoples depend on a viable and sufficient quantity and
quality of water. For example, water is essential to the Aboriginal rights to fish,
hunt, and trap. Water is also essential as a means of transportation for many
Aboriginal people. In fact, the absolute necessity of water to the lives of Aboriginal people has made it a significant part of their spiritual and cultural existence
as well. It is for these main reasons that many Aboriginal leaders advocate the
recognition of an Aboriginal right to govern this resource within their traditional
territories.
All communities rely on sources of potable water for drinking and household
use. Native communities that manage their own water systems may face specific
problems, as alternative sources of potable water may not be available. The
production and delivery of potable water is often taken for granted until problems
occur, sometimes with tragic consequences. After incidents in Walkerton, Ontario,
in 2000, North Battleford, Saskatchewan, in 2001, and more recently in the First
Nations community of Kashechewan, Ontario, in 2005, improving the safety
of drinking water has become a priority in Canada, especially in First Nation
communities.2 Providing safe drinking water involves complex technical, human,
financial, and regulatory factors. In First Nations communities, the relationship
between the federal government and First Nations, and the unique situation of
each First Nation add to this complexity.
Federal programs and funding related to drinking water on reserves are based
on government policy adopted in the 1960s and 1970s, and parliamentary appropriations. The objective of the government policy is to ensure that people living
on-reserve attain a comparable level of health and have access to water facilities
comparable to those of other Canadians living in communities of similar size and
location. However, these very government policies often prevent this objective
from being attained. This is mainly due to the fact that these policies lack input
from Aboriginal communities and fail to take into consideration the unique
circumstances and issues that these communities face. Until a regulatory regime
which takes Aboriginal concerns and values into consideration is in place, INAC
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and Health Canada cannot ensure that First Nations people living on-reserve have
access to safe drinking water.
This paper first explores the current federal policy adopted by government
to deal with the issue of safe drinking water in First Nations communities, and
the insufficiencies of this policy. Secondly, it suggests two working approaches
to water quality in these communities. The first is the creation of a co-management regime between the federal government and First Nations governments. The
second is a recognition of an Aboriginal right to govern the water resources within
their traditional territory.3

Unique Susceptibility of First Nations Communities
and Their Members to Pollutants
The economic condition and health status of Aboriginal peoples are among the
lowest of any ethnic or minority group in Canada. Poverty, poor health, and more
limited access to health care all make Aboriginal Canadians more susceptible
to adverse impacts from pollution.4 Although fiduciary duties, treaties, and the
Indian Act obligate the federal government to provide health-related services to
First Nations, shamefully, government departments responsible for these services
have a history of being grossly under-funded and under-staffed.
Traditional, cultural, and subsistence uses of, and strong dependencies on,
natural resources such as water make First Nations especially susceptible to
adverse health affects from pollution. In many cases, First Nations “have greater
exposure risks than the general population as a result of their dietary practices and
unique cultures that embrace the environment.”5 Hunting, gathering, and fishing
are necessary not only for survival, but also for maintaining the cultural, social,
spiritual, and economic aspects of Aboriginal communities. Frequently, the right
to engage in gathering, hunting, and fishing is legally protected by treaty. First
Nations and their members also use water, plants, and animals in religious, traditional, and cultural ceremonies and practices. When pollutants contaminate the
air, water, soil, plants, and animals, these pollutants will likely accumulate in the
people through consumption, ingestion, contact and inhalation.6
A recent example of the tragedy that can occur when pollutants go unchecked
occured in the Aboriginal community of Kashechewan. Kashechewan’s water
treatment plant, funded in 1995 by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC),
was designed by out-of-town consultants. It was placed downstream from an
existing sewage lagoon. This essentially means that contaminants flow past the
intake pipe that feeds raw water into the complex system to be treated for drinking.
In 2004, Indian Affairs spent $500,000 for upgrades, but did not move the intake
pipe.7 Furthermore, Band leaders say that they never received proper training, or
enough funding to run the plant, which requires 24-hour maintenance.8 In late
October 2005, the evacuation of more than 1,000 community members began as
the situation descended into crisis when federal officials warned of high E. coli
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levels in tap water. Almost all of these residents were evacuated due to scabies,
impetigo and other health-related problems from E. coli-laced water.
Unfortunately, the threat of such contamination is not only limited to the health
of Aboriginal communities, but extends also to the health and well-being of future
generations. Several studies have shown that children are particularly susceptible
to the effects of pollution. For example, industry has devastated the traditional
lifestyle of the Mohawk community on the Akwesasne reservation. Core samples
of the St. Lawrence River bottom have found over 6,000 ppm of polychlorinated
biphenyls (“PCBs”).9 However, while the PCB concentrations in the breast milk
of Mohawk women decreased over time, their infants’ urine PCB levels were ten
times higher than that of their mothers.10
Situations such as these indicate that oftentimes it is the people who are most
at risk who should be entitled to determine the relevant environmental standards
that will govern their resources. However, as the next section will demonstrate,
Aboriginal peoples have little decision-making authority under the current federal
policy governing drinking water quality on reserve lands.

Current Jurisdictional Responsibilities and Policy
Over Water Quality
It is current government policy that the management of potable drinking water and
waste water on First Nation reserves, from source to tap, is a shared responsibility
between First Nations and the federal government. First Nations Band councils,
INAC (advised by Environment Canada), and Health Canada provide programs
and services that are meant to ensure safe, clean, and secure water on reserves.
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) has the primary authority for fulfilling the federal government’s constitutional, treaty, political, and legal responsibilities for First Nations. Since the early 1960s, the department has provided support
to assist individuals living on-reserve in accessing basic infrastructure services,
i.e. water, waste water treatment, roads, bridges, schools etc.11 In addition, the
department is authorized to provide funding assistance to operate and maintain
these assets. INAC’s primary role today is satisfied through the provision of
funding and advisory activities.12
INAC funding for infrastructure services is provided through a variety of
funding arrangements. These funding arrangements include terms and conditions,
and reporting requirements that INAC uses to ensure that First Nations meet
program requirements. For example, subject to approval, based in part upon a
review of the First Nation’s financial management track record, and the availability of funds, finances are provided to reserve communities for capital construction and upgrading, operation and maintenance, and water and waste water plants
through INAC’s Capital Facilities and Maintenance Program. However, INAC’s
funding to subsidize the operation and maintenance of water treatment and distribution systems is in accordance with an established formula. The remaining
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funding is to be provided locally from user fees or other revenue sources.13 INAC
also provides funding to First Nations to share services, such as water, with neighboring municipalities through municipal-type agreements when this is a costeffective and practical solution.
Health Canada’s general mandate regarding the protection of public health is
found in the Department of Health Act,14 1996. This legislation delineates the
health matters in which the Minister may act, while respecting provincial jurisdiction. These matters include, but are not limited to, investigations and research into
public health, monitoring of diseases, providing public-health information, establishing safety standards for consumer products, and co-operating with provincial
authorities to coordinate efforts to preserve and improve public health.15
Health Canada, in collaboration with INAC, is responsible for ensuring safe
drinking water in First Nation communities south of 60˚. As part of the Environmental Health Program, and through the Drinking Water Safety Program, Health
Canada is responsible for working with First Nations to monitor drinking water
quality in distribution systems with five or more connections and cisterns in First
Nation communities. Water quality sampling, testing, and interpretations are to
be done according to the Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality, Sixth
Edition, Health Canada.
Environment Canada’s main responsibility in regards to safe drinking water in
First Nations communities is with respect to waste water management. Environment Canada provides advice and technical expertise to INAC on assessments
under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act, and on requirements related
to the Canadian Environmental Protection Act, 1999, and the Fisheries Act. Environment Canada develops standards, guidelines and/or protocols for waste water
systems on federal and Aboriginal lands, including effluent limits.
INAC policy states that on-reserve waste water treatment systems are to be
designed and operated in such a way that effluent quality meets the requirements of
the latest edition of the Guidelines for Effluent Quality and Waste water Treatment
at Federal Establishments, established by Environment Canada, and other applicable provincial/territorial requirements, if these are stricter.16 It is important to
note that First Nations values and ideas are not taken into consideration under this
current government policy.
Under current government policy, First Nations are responsible for ensuring
that water and waste water systems are planned, designed, constructed, and maintained and operated according to funding agreement conditions.17 First Nations
are legally required to comply with all program and financial terms and conditions
in their funding agreements. However, there is very little room for First Nations to
vary the structure of these agreements to meet local needs and concerns.
All proposed capital projects for water and waste water systems, funded by
INAC, must comply with the terms and conditions of the funding agreement
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under the Capital Facilities and Maintenance Program. For all INAC-funded
capital projects, First Nations are responsible for:
• Project identification;
• Feasibility (engineering) studies;
• Environmental assessments;
• Project design;
• Project construction;
• Plant classification; and
• Commissioning.18
First Nations are required to:
• Follow INAC’s tendering policy;
• Conduct regular site inspections;
• Provide construction and financial progress reports;
• Submit a project completion report;
• Secure “as build” drawings for future reference; and
• Develop site-specific maintenance management plans.19
First Nations require INAC approvals for all capital project components from
the feasibility stage to the commissioning stage as per INAC policy.
Under current government policy, First Nations must follow INACs and Health
Canada’s monitoring and inspection regimes. All sampling and testing procedures
performed during monitoring activities must be carried out as defined in the monitoring and inspection regime, including the use of accredited laboratories. If a
First Nation does not follow this regime, and depending on the level of risk to
health, gradual compliance assurance will be started by INAC.20 This will include
things such as written warnings; holdbacks from “non-essential” funding; and
ultimately, third-party management.
INAC provides a funding subsidy to First Nations for the operations and maintenance (O&M) of water and waste water facilities on reserves. First Nations
Chief and Council are responsible for assuming partial financial responsibility for
the remaining funding through user fees and/or other revenue sources. However,
funding for O&M must be used for the purposes described in the funding agreements, and First Nations are responsible for demonstrating that these funds were
spent on INAC’s intended purposes, regardless of what the First Nation views to
be an intended purpose.
As demonstrated by this policy model, currently First Nations have very little
flexibility in creating standards or regulations to ensure high water quality in their
communities. Under section 81(1) of the Indian Act,21 a Band council is given
the power to make by-laws for a number of different purposes. The provision of
section 81(1) which could give a Band council jurisdiction over water quality
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management is section 81(1)(l)—the construction and regulation of the use of
public wells, cisterns, reservoirs, and other water supplies.
However, bylaws can be disallowed by the Minister of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development. Once passed, a bylaw must be forwarded to the Minister,
and it automatically comes into force after forty days unless it is disallowed
[s. 82(2)]. A further problem, discussed below, is that the by laws are limited in
their geographic scope. In other words, by laws only apply on the reserve. Even if
a water body or fishery is near the reserve and affects a Band’s on-reserve water
quality, the bylaw-making power is strictly confined to the physical boundaries
of the reserve. Another limitation is that Band Councils do not have the power to
make bylaws in relation to “navigable” rivers, even if a river is physically on the
reserve.
Another limitation is that the bylaw-making power of Band councils is largely
restricted to regulatory and administrative matters. This restriction may prevent the
adoption of a proper water management scheme on reserve lands. For example, it
is doubtful whether a Band bylaw which attempted to say that all waters are in the
control of a Band would be valid. This would be seen as an illegal expropriation.
As a result, drinking water quality on reserves is governed by current federal
policy. However, currently there is no regulatory regime in place to deal with this
resource. Therefore, funding arrangements seem to play a large role in dictating
water quality standards and requirements. As the next section will demonstrate,
this policy model creates significant issues in the provision of safe drinking water
on reserves.

Issues with the Current Policy Model
Regulatory Gap for Drinking Water on Reserves
In its recent report, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development found that INAC, Health Canada, and First Nations do not operate under
a regulatory regime as most provinces do. There is no effective legislative base
for regulating potable water on reserves. The operative federal standards, set out
in the Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality, are just that—guidelines
with no legislative teeth. Instead, INAC and Health Canada use funding arrangements with First Nations, and administrative documents as the means to set and
enforce requirements for water quality and safety.
INAC attempts to fill this “regulatory gap” by referring to provincial legislation and regulation in its policies and administrative guidelines, and in funding
arrangements with First Nations. However, the Report of the Commissioner of the
Environment and Sustainable Development (“the Report”) found that important
elements covered in most provincial regulatory regimes are missing from the
guidelines and funding arrangements.22 These include the approval and licensing
of water treatment plants, ongoing monitoring, public reporting requirements, and
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compliance and enforcements mechanisms. In practice, this means, for example,
that where a province requires water treatment plants to be licensed or certified,
the plants located in First Nations communities face no such regulation from the
provinces.
The Report also found that INAC administrative guidelines are not consistently implemented.23 These guidelines require, among other things, that new
water systems meet provincial regulations, except where they are less stringent
than those of the federal government. Department officials informed the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development that they do not feel
obliged to comply fully with or enforce provincial regulations.24 They also stated
that they do not have the human resources and capacity that the provinces have to
support and enforce them.25
INAC is drafting new administrative guidelines for drinking water systems in
First Nations communities as a component of the First Nations Water Management Strategy. However, the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable
Development reviewed the document, and found that it falls short of providing an
effective regulatory regime because the guidelines apply only to INAC officials.26
Furthermore, the Report found that it will not be enforceable through legislation
or regulations, and how it will apply to First Nations remains unclear.27
Most frequently, INAC relies on funding arrangements with First Nations to
define drinking water requirements on reserve lands. However, the language in
the arrangements is general and does not specifically refer to water systems.28 In
2001, in a submission to the Walkerton Inquiry, the Chiefs of Ontario stated: “First
Nations, their consultants, and federal officials are left to discern the applicable
standards from vague and conflicting language in funding conditions, guidelines
and manuals.”29 Unfortunately, even with the First Nations Water Management
Strategy, this situation has not changed significantly.
Funding arrangements between INAC and First Nations require First Nations
to adhere to all applicable codes and standards, and preserve health and safety.
However, it is not clear whether and how the First Nations are to incorporate all
the elements found in provincial legislation and regulations in the management
of their drinking water. The Chiefs of Ontario also commented, in a submission
to the Walkerton Inquiry, that “The question of ‘which law applies’ is inherently
uncertain for most activities that take place on reserves because of the judicially
undefined scope of Aboriginal rights and the vague and subjective tests which
govern the division of powers impacting on ‘Indianness.’”30
Currently, there is no legislation requiring that drinking water quality and
safety in First Nations communities be monitored. More importantly, there is no
First Nations–specific legislation on water quality of environmental standards in
Canada. It is Health Canada’s policy that it has no statutory- or regulatory-based
enforcement or inspection powers for water quality on reserves.31 Therefore,
departmental staff members are not legally empowered to ensure that all required
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tests are carried out. In addition, First Nations are not legally empowered to test
their drinking water. Consequently, residents in First Nation communities do not
benefit from testing practices comparable to those in non-reserve communities.
Under the Drinking Water Safety Program, Health Canada enters into funding
arrangements with most First Nations, or contracts with individuals, to test
drinking water as recommended under the Guidelines for Canadian Drinking
Water Quality. However, under these arrangements, the only consequence for
failing to carry out tests is that funds are withheld.32

Water Systems Do Not Meet All Applicable Codes and Standards
The Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development found that INAC has no comprehensive list of codes and standards applicable to the design and construction of water systems.33 Codes and standards are set
out in various documents, funding arrangements, administrative documents, and
project briefs. In these documents, the definitions of codes and standards range
from the requirement to meet “all applicable codes and standards” to references to
either a general or specific list of codes and standards.34 It is unclear which definitions are applicable and will be applied to a given project.
This issue can have consequences for the quality or safety of drinking water.
INAC’s 2001 assessment of water systems found many design or construction
faults. In fact, these faults explain a portion of the 75% of water systems that were
classified as risky.35 As history has demonstrated, these deficiencies can result in
risks to operator safety, failure to achieve the treatment performance, or inability
to produce the expected water quantity.
Under the First Nations Water Management Strategy, INAC has committed to
ensuring that all water systems on reserves are built to standards. It has developed
draft administrative guidelines to define it own requirements. In their current
form, these guidelines clarify some requirements, but it is not clear how First
Nations will implement them.36

Water Testing is Inconsistent
It is well known that drinking water needs to be tested regularly as a final check
on the safety of the supply chain for drinking water, and to protect public health.
However, regular tests of drinking water are not carried out in most First Nation
reserve communities.37
Although Health Canada’s overall target is to reach the testing frequency
recommended in the Guidelines for Canadian Drinking Water Quality by 2008,
as late as November 2005, the department had yet to develop a comprehensive
plan, with specific target dates, to meet this overall target.38 In addition, it does
not ensure that First Nations test their drinking water as required in the funding
arrangements, contracts and Health Canada procedure manual.39 Although Health
Canada does not provide funds when tests are not carried out, the absence of tests
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hampers Health Canada’s and First Nations’ ability to detect potential water quality
problems and make timely and informed decisions to deal with these issues.
As previously stated, Health Canada’s policy is that it has only an advisory role
to First Nations when tests show that the drinking water is not safe to drink. At its
discretion, the Department may recommend that a First Nation issue a boil-water
advisory to users. According to Health Canada, First Nations have the authority
to put in place and lift advisories, and they have the responsibility, with assistance
from INAC, Health Canada, tribal councils, and other support organizations, to
correct the underlying causes. However, some advisories have been in place for
many years.40

Support and Capacity Development is Inadequate
The Report of the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development found that INAC’s programs are limited in scope, and that the technical help
available to First Nations to support and develop their capacity to provide safe
drinking water is fragmented.41 The report identified weaknesses in three main
areas: operators, funding, and information and monitoring.
Operators

Most water treatment plant operators in First Nations communities do not posses
the knowledge and skills required to operate their plant safely. The 2001 assessment found that approximately 10% of the operators on reserves met the certification requirements of their respective province.42 Under the First Nations
Water Management Strategy, INAC introduced a requirement that all on-reserve
operators be certified to the level of complexity of their water treatment plant, in
accordance with the rules applicable in their province. The target is to certify all
operators or ensure that uncertified operators are directly supervised by a certified
operator by 2006.
INAC’s statistics indicate that at the end of March 2005, about 40% of the
operators were certified.43 However, for one region included in these statistics,
the Commissioner of the Environment and Sustainable Development found that
although many of the operators were trained and had passed exams, they were not
certified.44 In addition, the statistics do not indicate if the operators are certified
to the level of complexity of their plants. Furthermore, as provincial certification and training requirements are becoming more stringent, many First Nations
operators have difficulty meeting educational and experience requirements. Also,
for more complex water treatment plants, a minimum number of years of experience operating such a facility under appropriate supervision is required before
certification.
As previously stated, the main support available to operators comes from the
Circuit Rider Training Program funded by INAC in all regions. However, this
type of support and training is not mandatory or accessible to all First Nations.45
In addition, INAC does not require a training plan to be in place.46 Also, a lot of
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the trainer’s time is spent resolving immediate technical problems rather than
providing training.47 In summary, the Report indicates that there is a high probability that the certification target will not be met.48
Funding

INAC does not use a consistent method to fund First Nations for the operation
and maintenance (O&M) of their water systems. Its policy is to allocate O&M
funds on the basis of a formula. The amount allocated to each First Nation should
cover 80% of the estimated O&M costs of drinking water systems. However, the
formula has not been updated for many years. In some regions, the Department
does not use the formula, and provides some First Nations with 80% of their
actual O&M costs if they can provide sufficient evidence of paying these costs.49
Under the First Nations Water Management Strategy, INAC is implementing a new method to estimate O&M costs and allocate funds. This method takes
into account the characteristics of each water system, and as a result, many First
Nations are eligible for additional funding. However, it is not clear whether this
method will apply to all First Nations, or if actual costs will continue to be paid
in some cases.50
INAC does not know whether all funds for operation and maintenance are used
for this purpose. Under the applicable funding conditions, First Nations have the
flexibility to use O&M funds for other purposes, and INAC has limited assurance
that they are used for the intended purpose. At this time, it is not clear whether
INAC will make funding conditions uniform under the First Nations Water
Management Strategy, and how it will obtain assurances that the funds are being
used as intended.
Another issue related to operation and maintenance funding of water systems is
based on the fact that under INAC’s O&M guidelines, First Nations are expected
to cover 20% of the O&M costs of water systems through user fees or other
sources. In practice, few First Nations collect user fees.51 Moreover, INAC does
not take into consideration whether First Nations have other resources to meet this
requirement, and has no means to enforce it.52
Information and Monitoring

INAC has limited information on whether First Nations meet the conditions of
their funding arrangements, and whether its programs and funding result in safe
drinking water. To monitor the state of water systems, INAC requires First Nations
to provide information annually on their O&M plans and activities, and the results
of an inspection of the condition of their water systems every three to five years.
However, in many cases, INAC does not know whether regular maintenance
identified by First Nations was completed, or whether urgent maintenance or
repair projects are needed.53 Some reports requested by INAC are not provided
by all First Nations, even though they would be useful to both INAC and the First
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Nations. For example, First Nations are supposed to have maintenance management plans in place for their water systems. However, INAC does not require
evidence that these plans are in place and used.54 In addition, regions are supposed
to ensure that annual maintenance inspections are completed. These are not being
done systematically.55 Moreover, periodic inspections are not always carried out
when due, and some inspection reports provided by First Nations contain poorquality information.56 As a result, the information system in place to record the
results of water system inspections is not reliable.
As a result of their funding arrangements, when deficiencies in a water system
are noted in a report to INAC, First Nations are responsible for correcting them.
However, there is no effective means to inform INAC that the deficiencies are
corrected, and the Department has limited means to ensure that a First Nation
has addressed the deficiencies. Furthermore, INAC cannot threaten to withdraw
O&M funding to facilitate a correction because drinking water is an essential
service.57 Under the First Nations Water Management Strategy, INAC has undertaken a review of its information needs and data collection processes for drinking
water, but it is yet to be seen whether this review will be successful and what
actions will result from it.

Co-management as a Solution
As the previous section has demonstrated, significant regulatory changes need
to be made in order to ensure that Aboriginal communities are receiving good
quality water. However, if these changes are to be effective, they must be created
and implemented with the participation and support of the Aboriginal communities which they affect. In recent decades, there has been considerable attention
paid to co-management as an important mechanism for the effective management
of natural resources. The term “co-management” refers to a wide range of organizational arrangements, functions, and levels of power-sharing. It encompasses
everything from relatively simple arrangements with government managers
sharing power with users over limited resources and geographic areas, to legislated arrangements evolving from Aboriginal self-government negotiations.58 As
a result, this paper adopts Notzke’s general definition: “ ‘Co-management’ broadly
refers to the sharing of power and responsibility between government and local
resource users. This is achieved by various levels of integration of local and state
level management systems.”59
Aboriginal support for a co-management role over water and other natural
resources is aimed at the recognition and integration of Aboriginal concerns,
Aboriginal rights, and Aboriginal expertise into the management and policy
arenas concerning water resources. Aboriginal governments argue that the era
of paternalistic, unilateral decision-making by the federal government is over,
super-ceded by the more forward-looking policy of encouraging the exercise of
Aboriginal rights and Aboriginal self-determination. Co-management is one
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approach that fits within this era of recognition and reconciliation of Aboriginal
rights with the rights of the Canadian population at large.
Integration of First Nations as co-managers provides an effective means of
addressing some of the complex issues discussed above concerning the provision
of safe drinking water to Aboriginal communities in Canada. Integration of tribes
as co-managers moves the major parties closer to developing more effective
measures to deal with the difficult scientific and policy issues involved with water
quality. Co-management provides a unique opportunity for the application of
Aboriginal traditional ecological knowledge to increasingly complex problems
that require a broader and deeper understanding of the phenomena at issue.60 As
previously stated, often times it is the community most affected by an issue which
is in the best position to come up with the most effective and appropriate means
to deal with the problem.
The 1987 amendments to the United States’ Clean Water Act61 demonstrate
an example of one of the highest forms of co-management—one that has been
enshrined in federal legislation. The 1987 amendments to the Clean Water Act
provide the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) with the authority to approve
a tribe for treatment as a state for certain purposes enumerated in the act.62 One
of the enumerated sections for which tribes may seek approval is Section 303,
the water quality standard provision of the act. Section 303 permits a state, or a
tribe treated as a state, to establish water quality standards for the water resources
within the state’s or the tribe’s governmental jurisdiction. However, a tribe must
first demonstrate four categories of authority and capability in order to be treated
as a state by the EPA. First, the tribe must be one that is recognized by the Department of the Interior.63 Second, the tribe must have a governing body carrying out
substantial governmental duties and powers.64 Third, the functions to be exercised
must concern the management and protection of the water resources which are
held by an Indian tribe, held in trust by the United States for Indians, held by
a member of an Indian tribe subject to a restriction, or otherwise within the
borders of an Indian reservation.65 Finally, the tribe must show that it is reasonably expected to be capable, in the Administrator’s judgment, of carrying out the
functions to be exercised.66
Water quality standards establish the desired ambient nature of a water body.67
Under this co-management system, the appropriate state or tribal authority establishes designated beneficial uses for the water resources under its jurisdiction, then
develops narrative and numerical criteria to protect the designated uses.68 Each set
of standards must contain an anti-degradation clause, intended to prohibit further
polluting of the water.69
Once established and approved, these water quality standards apply to lakes,
rivers and streams, or portions thereof. If there is a discharge into a segment of the
water body, the required permit issued to the discharger must nominally meet any
applicable water quality standards.70 A permit cannot be issued if the discharge
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would violate these standards.71 When drafting a permit, the EPA seeks certification from the state or from a tribe that the limitations in the proposed permit will
not violate existing water quality standards.72 Moreover, a discharge permit must
be conditioned so as not to violate downstream stands.73
These aspects of tribal power under the Clean Water Act have been upheld by
United States courts. For instance, in New Mexico, the Isleta Pueblo, an Indian
tribe downstream from the City of Albuquerque on the Rio Grande, was granted
Clean Water Act tribes-as-states status, and adopted water quality standards more
stringent than those of the state of New Mexico.74 Albuquerque challenged the
EPA’s approval and subsequent enforcement of those standards—which included
requiring changes to Albuquerque’s National Pollution Discharge Elimination
System (NPDES) permit for an upstream waste water treatment facility—on a
variety of grounds, including challenging the authority of EPA to implement more
stringent tribal standards against non-Indian entities off-reservation.75 The court
upheld the EPA’s application of the tribe’s standards, expressly holding that the
Isleta Pueblo’s right to adopt water quality standards more stringent than those of
an upstream state was rooted not just in the Clean Water Act, but also in the tribe’s
“inherent sovereignty.”76
There is no one-size-fits-all approach to co-management. Each First Nation,
as a unique, self-determining community, has developed its own institutions, resources, and procedures. Each First Nation’s rights are based on legal
documents, i.e. treaties, and histories specific to that community. Furthermore, the
local situation within which each First Nation is embedded is unique, with particularized landscapes, resource issues, and user groups. Therefore, the means by
which a particular First Nation can be integrated into a decision-making process
for water and waterways needs to be developed on a First Nation–specific basis.
Nonetheless, there are some fundamental, overarching principles that can
govern each co-management agreement regarding water quality. First, the role
that First Nation governments play in a co-management regime must be developed
within a framework that recognizes that they are in fact governments, accountable
for the health and welfare of their membership. Such recognition can serve to
ensure the protection of the Aboriginal interest in resources critical to the longterm economic security, political integrity, and health and well-being of their
communities.
Second, First Nations should be made an integral part of the decision-making
process. The very term co-management means that First Nations participate in
the decision-making process. First Nations should be sitting at the table from
the earliest stages of policy formulation, problem identification, and development
of solutions to water quality. In order to effectively deal with the water quality
issues within Aboriginal communities, their leaders or representatives need to be
included at the very beginning of the decision-making process. Such front loading
of First Nation participation not only reduces the potential for long-term, disruptive
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conflict over policies and proposed solution, but it also facilitates the incorporation of critical information and technical expertise possessed by the Aboriginal
communities.
Third, the input provided by tribes should be considered expert information,
and given a certain degree of deference. Traditional Aboriginal knowledge of
ecological systems, developed from generations of interaction with the environment, influences tribal beliefs regarding resource use and management.77 Aboriginal environmental knowledge is integrated with tribal religious beliefs and world
view in many different ways.78 While current economic, social, and political
factors affect Aboriginal world views,79 there is a certain consistency of traditional environmental knowledge influencing First Nation environmental decisionmaking.80 A water resource co-management approach is an important tool because
it offers First Nations the opportunity to integrate traditional Aboriginal values
and knowledge with contemporary resource management policies.
Fourth, a co-management system should incorporate mechanisms for resolving
disputes, and differences in opinion and approach among the co-managing
parties. As diverse stakeholders with interests and perspectives that might be at
odds, the parties to a co-management regime must develop methods and mechanisms to deal with disputes. Unilateral decision-making by one party upsets the
power balance between the co-managing powers. One useful model for integrated
decision-making and dispute resolution is the Columbia River Fisheries Management Plan (CRFMP), a complex arrangement for the management of Indian and
non-Indian fisheries on the Columbia River that involves four Indian tribes, three
states and two federal agencies. The CRFMP contains detailed provisions for
dispute resolution among the parties, recognizing the likelihood of disagreement
on technical and policy matters.81 The CRFMP provides for an internal dispute
resolution mechanism through which policy or technical disputes are brought
before the Policy Committee, a body comprised of representatives appointed by
each party, and charged with the task of “facilitating cooperative action by the
Parties,”82 Moreover, the CRFMP remains under the continuing jurisdiction of the
federal district court for Oregon, and a special magistrate is available to hear and
resolve disputes between the parties that cannot be resolved through the internal
dispute resolution process.83
Though a co-management regime is not without its faults, a co-management
regime for water resources offers several advantages to First Nations, including
the opportunity to participate in and influence the development of water quality
policies that affect them. Once First Nation governments gain “a seat at the
table,” they have the opportunity to integrate Aboriginal beliefs and management
practices with mainstream policies on water quality. At the same time, co-management approaches also help water quality policymakers learn about the values,
culture and way of life of Aboriginal people. This is important because it helps
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government policymakers understand traditional Aboriginal views, and avoid
potential disputes and tragedies, such as the recent incident at Kashechewan.

Self-governance as a Solution
Though co-management is a desirable objective for First Nation governments,
arguably many leaders are advocating for a system of self-governance to rectify
issues in their communities, such as water quality. A definition of Aboriginal “selfgovernment” is difficult to formulate, as the term has been used to describe many
different types of political systems. Essentially, self-government arrangements
grant Aboriginal people some degree of decision-making power in specified areas.
In Delgamuukw v. The Queen84 the Gitskan and Wet’suwet’en people claimed
ownership and jurisdiction, including self-government, over a territory in central
British Columbia. In dissent, British Columbia Court of Appeal Justice Lambert
articulated the plaintiffs’ claim for self-government as a claim for a “right of selfregulation of themselves and their institutions.”85
Self-government is critical to Aboriginal culture. The plaintiffs in Delgamuukw
argued that self-government is necessary “in order to determine their development
and safeguard their integrity as Aboriginal peoples” and “to preserve and enhance
their social, political, cultural, linguistic, and spiritual identity.”86 Since contact,
Aboriginal communities have done everything humanly possible to maintain the
integrity and vitality of their own traditions, languages, ceremonies, and other
authoritative internal arrangements, and to continue fulfilling their ancestral obligations to one another and the rest of creation,87 despite immense changes to their
physical and economic circumstances, and pressures from non-Aboriginal institutions.88 Arguably, ensuring high water quality is necessary to preserve Aboriginal
traditions and customs, as well as to preserve the health and well-being of the
communities themselves. This, combined with the fact that the current federal
policy on drinking water quality on reserves lacks a sufficient regulatory regime,
makes it clear why First Nation governments would find a right to govern water
quality preferable.
If First Nations were able to prove an Aboriginal right to self-governance, then
this right would receive protection through s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982.
This section reads:
35. (1) The existing Aboriginal and treaty rights of Aboriginal peoples of Canada are
hereby recognized and affirmed.

However, as case law has demonstrated, proving an Aboriginal right to self-governance is not an easy right to prove. Courts have yet to articulate a clear statement
on the legal status of the right to self-government, let alone on the scope of the
right and its relationship to federal and provincial laws.89
R. v. Van der Peet90 sets out the test for determining the practices, customs,
and traditions which fall within s. 35(1) and, as such, provide the legal standard
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against which a claim to regulate water quality as a part of self-government must
be measured. In Van der Peet, the test for identifying Aboriginal rights was said
to be as follows: “… in order to be an Aboriginal right an activity must be an
element of a practice, custom, or tradition integral to the distinctive culture of the
Aboriginal group claiming the right.”91 In applying this test, the court must first
identify the exact nature of the activity claimed to be a right, and must then go on
to determine whether, on the evidence presented to the trial judge, and on the facts
as found by the trial judge, that the activity could be said to be “a defining feature
of the culture in question” prior to contact with Europeans.92
In turning to the first part of Van der Peet, the court held that:
To characterize an applicant’s claim correctly, a court should consider such factors as the
nature of the action which the applicant is claiming was done pursuant to an Aboriginal
right, the nature of the governmental regulation, statute or action being impugned, and
the practice, custom or tradition being relied upon to establish the right.93

In R. v. Pamajewon94 the court considered whether the right to self-government
falls within the scope of the Aboriginal rights recognized and affirmed by s. 35(1)
of the Constitution Act, 1982. In making its decision, the court assumed, without
deciding, that s. 35(1) encompasses claims to Aboriginal self-government;
however, the applicable legal standard is that laid out in Van der Peet. Speaking
for the court, Lamer, C.J. stated:
Assuming s. 35(1) encompasses claims to Aboriginal self-government, such claims must
be considered in light of the purposes underlying that provision and must, therefore, be
considered against the test derived from consideration of those purposes. This is the test
laid out in Van der Peet. In so far as they can be made under s. 35(1), claims to selfgovernment are no difference from other claims to the enjoyment of Aboriginal rights
and must, as such, be measured against the same standard.95

The court found that to recognize “a broad right to manage the use of their
reserve lands” would be to cast the court’s inquiry at a level of excessive generality.96 Therefore, the right to self-government must be looked at in light of the
specific history and culture of the Aboriginal group claiming the right.97 The right
to self-government, according to the test laid out in Van der Peet, must be considered at the appropriate level of specificity.98
According to these tests, the correct characterization of the right put forward
is that of a right to regulate water quality as part of self-government. Therefore,
individuals and First Nations’ government advocating for recognition of this right
must first prove that the practice of managing water quality was exercised prior to
the contact. Though little physical evidence is likely to exist to demonstrate this
fact, oral histories and the “common law” practices of these groups could be used
to demonstrate that this right existed, and that it was exercised prior to European
contact. However, under the tests enunciated in these cases, First Nations must
also prove that regulating water quality was integral to their distinctive cultures.
As previously stated, water is the lifeblood for many of these communities. It is
used to not only meet physical needs, but cultural and sacred needs as well. Many
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Aboriginal villages were traditionally located on waterways, and this resource
was depended upon for food, household needs, travel, and ceremonial practices.
Arguably, ensuring water quality was “integral to the distinctive culture(s)” of
these Aboriginal groups and should be found “worthy” to merit the constitutional
protection of s. 35(1).
Even if courts were to recognize an Aboriginal right to regulate water quality,
this will not necessarily solve all the issues outlined in the first part of this paper.
As this paper has demonstrated, one of the major issues affecting water quality
on First Nation reserves is capacity building. Even if First Nations were to gain
ownership and control of this resource, this in itself, would not be enough to
solve this problem. In fact, some may even argue that this change in ownership
and jurisdiction would do more to reduce capacity building than develop it. Some
critics of Aboriginal self-governance argue that Aboriginal communities have too
few members with sufficient leadership skills, technical expertise, or practical
experience to meet the collective’s needs in these highly complex and difficult
circumstances.99
However, aggregation could be used by First Nations to help improve and
build capacity within their communities. The Royal Commission on Aboriginal
Peoples (RCAP) commented extensively on this issue and argued that individual Aboriginal communities are too small to develop the necessary capacity to
govern the many jurisdictions often contemplated by the negotiating parties.100
RCAP recommended that these governance functions be carried out by Nations,
rather than individual Aboriginal communities. However, RCAP’s Nation-based
solution would represent a radical departure for a great majority of Aboriginal
groups across the country. Thus, while sympathetic to the commission’s premise
that the community may not represent the ideal governing building block for all
jurisdictions, many involved in self-government negotiations are discussing other
aggregation options.
One type of aggregation that could be used to more effectively govern water in
Aboriginal communities is a two-tier level of aggregation. Two-tier aggregation
involves a number of governments coming together and forming a second level,
“regional” government to deal with those issues that are beyond the capacity of
any of them to handle individually.101 In doing so, the participating governments
aggregate a number of their governance structures, processes, and functions
upwards to the newly formed body.102 The strength of the two-tier government lies in the framework it provides for: a) local Aboriginal communities to
work together to deliver services; b) the formalization of the political relationships amongst local Aboriginal communities; and c) the establishment of a
mechanism for joint decision-making.103 In looking at well-established, nonAboriginal two-tier aggregation models, it has been observed that, “the inherently
flexible, non-interventionist approach and the gradual expansion of activities in
response to local decisions have resulted in a system that is accepted, practical,
and functional.”104
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One must also consider the benefit of a two-tier system, in that it could be
structured to permit the assignment of operating responsibilities to one tier and
regulatory responsibility to the other. Brian Crowley, president of the Atlantic
Institute for Market Studies, a Halifax-based think tank, stated:
When the government is a supplier of a service, such as water, it tends to be a poor
regulator of quality. Regulator and supplier often work in the same department, may
belong to the same union, and are both responsible to the same elected officials—who
want to avoid unpleasantness and conflict. Problems are bushed up or ignored with a
wink and a nod. Governments can be far more rigorous regulators when they are at arm’s
length from the supplier.105

However, whether such delegation will be used with potable water, whether it
would be sustainable given that delegated responsibilities can be withdrawn and
whether a large Aboriginal body, such as a tribal council, is of sufficient size and
independence to exercise regulatory responsibilities is still unknown.106
Other potential weaknesses of this type of aggregation include that they are
not easy to understand and therefore reduce accountability to citizens or membership.107 This could pose an even greater disadvantage in Aboriginal communities
where citizens, on average, have lower education levels, and where accountability of government institutions is very important. Secondly, two-tier aggregation
requires a lot of effort to ensure that there is good coordination among the various
levels.108 As was previously mentioned, Aboriginal communities are already
struggling with capacity and resource issues. Finally, these types of systems are
costly to run109 and First Nation governments are often working from very limited
funding arrangements.
Instead of a tiered governance structure, aggregation can take many other
forms. A less “ambitious” form of aggregation, some may argue, is through special
purpose bodies that have the following characteristics:
• They usually focus on one area of public concern, such as education,
policing and water etc.;
• Unlike governments, they do not have the power to legislate;
• Any powers they do have are established in legislation of some level of
government; and
• The leadership of the body is not necessarily elected by citizens at
large.110
These special purpose bodies could have legislated powers, or they could not.
Those without any real powers tend to be advisory or advocacy in nature, and in
many instances they provide services to governments.
It has been stated that “in the everyday world of Canadian municipal government, especially in the rural areas of the smaller provinces, inter-municipal
problems are not solved by establishing new tiers of government or by drastically altering municipal boundaries.”111 In fact, local governments have found
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many advantages to using special purpose bodies to carry out their governance
functions. For example, local governments can remain distinct and responsible
for the things that they do best on their own. At the same time, they can join with
other local governments to undertake the delivery of services that are better or
more efficiently done in concert. Protection service, such as fire and ambulance,
sewage and waste disposal, and planning services are examples of services most
commonly delivered by joint agreements. However, this does not mean that
potable water could not fit within this realm as well. This service is greatly related
to sewage and waste disposal. In many instances these agreements can provide
an expanded level and variety of services to rural residents.112 Other reasons local
governments find this aggregation attractive are that they can save on costs by
either sharing expensive services, or by obtaining volume discounts.113 Furthermore, “joint hiring practices allow small local governments to recruit and share
professional and technical staff.”114
These advantages do not mean that this type of governance structure is not
without its disadvantages. However, it has been stated that these types of agreements are most effective in the provision of regional services in either of two
situations: 1) they are effective in predominately rural areas where services are
limited, and there is economic and demographic stability; or 2) they are effective
where a second tier of government takes responsibility for them.115 Therefore, this
might suggest that if Aboriginal governments were to gain jurisdiction and control
over water, a combination of a two-tier government system and a special purpose
body might be the most effective way to manage and regulate the resource.
Though recognizing a right to regulate water quality provides one potential
solution for drinking water quality on reserves, it is not without its own set of
potential obstacles and concerns. Currently, many Aboriginal communities do
not have the capacity or financial resources to effectively manage this resource.
However, there are steps these communities could take to increase their capacity
and resources to a higher level. One potential solution is aggregation. However,
because benefits tend to be over-estimated and costs tend to be under-estimated,116
this solution would have to be carefully studied before Aboriginal communities
committed to it.

Conclusion
Currently, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Health Canada, and First Nations
do not operate under a regulatory regime for drinking water as most provinces
do. As this paper has demonstrated, there are also many weaknesses in program
management in federal departments. As a result, when it comes to the safety of
drinking water, residents of First Nations communities do not benefit from a level
of protection comparable with that of Canadians living off-reserve. This is not
acceptable. Aboriginal Canadians, including Indigenous people living on “land
reserved for Indians,” are residents of the country, and should be entitled to safe
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drinking water on the same terms as those prevailing in other similarly placed
communities.
Water and water quality has always played an integral role in the lives of
Canada’s Aboriginal peoples. For many First Nations, water is a sacred element
in their existence, and forms an important part of their understanding of who they
are as a people. Based on these traditions, it is not inconceivable to consider that
Aboriginal peoples in Canada could have a right to manage this resource, or at
the very least a right to co-manage this resource. Though it would be naïve to
believe that all the issues surrounding water quality in First Nation communities
will simply disappear through a transfer or sharing of jurisdiction, it is not inconceivable to think that because of their vested and personal interest in this resource,
First Nation communities would be more willing to create regulatory structures to
govern this vital resource. If such a transfer were to occur, arguably aggregation
could prove to be a useful tool for these communities.
Not all First Nations communities may wish to have jurisdiction over this
resource, and, in reality, many may not be in a position to take over responsibility for safe drinking water in their communities. Co-management then offers a
unique solution in which Aboriginal communities work together with government
players to help ensure the provision of quality water in these communities. One
thing is clear, however, if First Nation communities are to have quality drinking
water—comparable to other mainstream Canadian communities—changes have
to be made to the current government policy on safe drinking water. The creation
of legislation and an adequate regulatory body must be a priority for all parties
responsible for this resource. To deal with such a complex set of issues all major
players and their political representatives will need to be involved. Only then can
a policy be created which recognizes and addresses all the concerns of the parties
involved—one that will ensure the provision of safe drinking water equally to all
Canadians.
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